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Abstract. An attacker, who is able to observe a web user over a long
period of time, learns a lot about his interests. It may be difficult to
track users with regularly changing IP addresses, though. We show how
patterns mined from web traffic can be used to re-identify a majority
of users, i. e. link multiple sessions of them. We implement the web user
re-identification attack using a Multinomial Naïve Bayes classifier and
evaluate it using a real-world dataset from 28 users. Our evaluation setup
complies with the limited knowledge of an attacker on a malicious web
proxy server, who is only able to observe the host names visited by its
users. The results suggest that consecutive sessions can be linked with
high probability for session durations from 5 minutes to 48 hours and
that user profiles degrade only slowly over time. We also propose basic
countermeasures and evaluate their efficacy.
1 Introduction
With the continuing dissemination of the World Wide Web we are increasingly
living our lives online. The websites that are retrieved by an individual reflect – at
least to some degree – his or her interests, habits and social network. The URL
of some pages may even disclose the user’s identity. If one is able to observe
a substantial portion of the web traffic of a user over some period of time,
he will learn many private details about this user. Many users are willing to
trust their ISP, who can trivially intercept all traffic from a dial-up account and
attribute it to the respective customer. Malicious observers or other third-party
service providers are not supposed to be able to compile profiles that contain
users’ interests together with their identity, though. Third parties that can easily
obtain users’ web traffic include open proxy servers, free WiFi hotspots as well as
single-hop anonymisation services like Anonymizer.com or the recently launched
IPREDator.se. As web browsers usually issue a DNS query before the requested
page can be retrieved, the providers of public DNS servers such as OpenDNS or
the recently launched Google Public DNS1 are also part of this group.
A malicious observer can group all requests originating from a single source
IP address and (assuming exactly one user per address) attribute all of them
1 See http://www.opendns.com/ and http://code.google.com/speed/public-dns/.
to a (now pseudonymous) single user. Clearly, in this scenario the attacker’s
capability to track a user over time mainly depends on the lifetime of the user’s
IP address. While it is straightforward to track users with static IP addresss, re-
identifying users with dynamically assigned, frequently changing IP addresses is
more challenging. The web user re-identification attack addresses this challenge.
In this paper we examine to which extent a passive observer can link the
web sessions of a given user solely based on a record of his past activities on
the web. Recently, privacy concerns have raised interest in such re-identification
problems [25]. The first stepping stone for long-term tracking attacks of web
users is linking two or multiple surfing sessions of individuals, which we address
in this paper. In the long run we are interested in a realistic threat assessment
of such linkage attacks in real-world environments. Note that we do not examine
how to recover the true identity of a web user based on their browsing behaviour
in this paper, though. Previous work, e. g. an analysis of the AOL search logs,
has shown that at least some users tend to disclose their identity via entering
uniquely personally identifying information in web forms or search engines [3].
The more sessions of one user an attacker can link, the more he will learn about
his interests and personality – and thus the more likely he will be able to uncover
the real-world identity of the user.
For the purpose of our evaluation we model a surfing session to consist of the
access frequencies of all hosts a user visits in a certain time window. We will use
machine learning techniques to link multiple sessions and analyse how effective a
malicious observer (or a third party mentioned above) can re-identify web users.
Without loss of generality, we will describe the attack from the perspective of a
malicious web proxy server.
Contribution Firstly, we demonstrate that Internet users exhibit characteristic
web browsing behaviour that can be exploited for linkage attacks. Our evaluation
on a privacy-preservingly collected real-world dataset demonstrates that even an
attacker with limited power can exploit characteristic behaviour to re-identify a
majority of users on a session-to-session basis. Contrary to previous work, i. e.
re-identifying users in 802.11 networks [28], which relies on numerous properties
of network traffic, our attack solely utilises destination host access frequencies.
Another novelty of our work is the transformation of the raw access frequency
vectors to counter the effects of the power-law distribution on access frequencies
and a thorough evaluation taking into account the attacker’s viewpoint. While
previous work operated on monthly traffic aggregates [18] and destination IP
addresses, we evaluate our approach for shorter sessions (between 5 minutes and
48 hours) and only rely on host (DNS) names. Furthermore, we discuss and
evaluate countermeasures that degrade the effectivity of the attack.
This paper is structured as follows: After reviewing related work in Section 2,
we briefly present the data mining techniques used for our attack in Section 3. We
continue with our data acquisition methodology in Section 4 before we describe
our evaluation methodology and results in Section 5. We present countermea-
sures in Section 6 and discuss the results in Section 7 before concluding the
paper in Section 8.
2 Related work
Closely related to our work are Kumpost’s publications [16,17,18], which describe
a large-scale study on NetFlow traffic logs. His ultimate goal and approach is
quite similar to ours: finding out whether it is possible to pinpoint individual
users among others due to their characteristic behaviour in the past. He devises
a classifier that compares behavioral vectors of users with a similarity measure
based on cosine similarity and shows that inverse document frequencies (IDF)
can improve re-identification accuracy. His study differs from ours in several
ways, though: Kumpost operates on monthly aggregates of the access frequencies
of hosts; on the contrary, we adopt an attacker’s point of view and track users
on a smaller scale and for shorter timeframes. Furthermore, while Kumpost
operates on network traces, we work with a pseudonymized web proxy dataset
specifically collected for this purpose. Finally, Kumpost only describes the actual
attack, whereas we also discuss and evaluate countermeasures.
Yang’s publications [27,36] and especially [35] are also related to our study.
Yang studies to which extent samples of 2 to 100 web users can be re-identified
with profiling and classification methods from a dataset containing 50,000 users
in total. As Yang’s focus is the utility of web user profiles for fraud detection
and other applications in e-commerce, she does not tackle the problem from our
attacker’s view. To some degree her methodology is comparable to our simula-
tions, but there are some differences, which are of relevance for our purpose. For
instance, while we concentrate on training sets of size 1, her evaluation focuses
on the improvements obtained by the use of multiple labelled training instances
(up to 100), which are usually difficult to obtain for the type of attacker we
have in mind. Another difference stems from the selection of training and test
instances: while Yang selects training and test instances with an arbitrary tem-
poral offset, we explicitly evaluate the influence of the temporal offset between
them in order to analyse profile degradation over time.
Also related is the work of Pang et al., which studies an attacker who aims
to re-identify users in 802.11 wireless networks [28]. Pang considers a number of
properties of network traffic to link multiple sessions of users – even if ephemeral,
pseudonymous MAC addresses are used. While they do look at exploiting des-
tination addresses for their linkability attack, their focus lies on characteristics
of 802.11 devices such as SSID probes, the size of broadcast packets and MAC
protocol fields. Their methodology, which relies on the Jaccard index and a
Naïve Bayes classifier with Gaussian kernel density estimation, differs from ours
considerably, though.
Data mining techniques have been applied to attack users’ privacy in many
related user re-identification and de-anonymization studies ([31,15,20,5,23] and
most recently [11,34]) and for attacks on anonymized traffic logs [29,9,8]. Web
usage mining (cf. [30,6,14,24]) is also a related area of work.
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Fig. 1: Venn diagram representation of the web user re-identification problem
3 Re-Identification Methodology
In the following sections we will present our methodology. We assume that most
users exhibit at least some part of their interests online, and that they are
reflected by the websites they access in a particular surfing session (cf. Fig. 1).
Our re-identification attack works on the intersection of two or more sessions of a
user. In an ideal world the intersections of one user will not substantially overlap
with the intersections of other users as they have a differing set of interests.
Both, term frequencies [37] and host access frequencies [1,4,10], have shown
to obey Zipf’s law: there is a small number of attributes (terms or hosts) that is
part of almost all instances (documents or sessions) and always occurs in large
frequencies. As a consequence we conjecture that text mining and web user
re-identification can be tackled with similar techniques. Therefore, we model
instances using the vector space model [2,21,33]. For our analysis, we apply the
Multinomial Naïve Bayes classifier, an off-the-shelf text mining technique, and
various transformations, which have proven effective for text mining problems,
to the input data.
3.1 Modelling the Web User Re-Identification Problem
Our analysis relies on a basic model that captures users’ surfing habits. With
this model we can reduce the web user re-identification attack to a data mining
classification problem [33], which can be tackled with various supervised learn-
ing methods. We consider each surfing session of a user to be an instance of
a class ci ∈ C, i. e. each class represents all surfing sessions of a specific user.
Each instance consists of the web browsing requests sent by a user’s machine
during one surfing session. From each HTTP request we only use the destina-
tion host name (e. g. www.google.com).2 We disregard port, path, filename and
other features. Instead of a binary encoding of the fact whether some host (e. g.
www.google.com) has been accessed or not, we take into account the number of
2 Accesses to various sub-domains are not merged, i. e. www.site.com, site.com and
www1.site.com are treated as different hosts.
requests to each host within a session to model usage intensity. The order of
requests as well as timing information is neglected in our basic model, as we
do not expect the behaviour of most users to show significant patterns in those
dimensions. There are certainly more sophisticated models conceivable, which
may take into account such characteristics.
Note that previous studies [16,17,18] have not relied on host names, but on
IP adddresses. While it is certainly possible to carry out the attack with IP
addresses only, we deem IP addresses not as suitable as host names: firstly, the
IP address of a web server may be subject to frequent changes, secondly, some
web sites may use multiple IPs for load distribution and thirdly, virtual hosts
may serve multiple different web sites from the same IP address. The instances
will reflect user interests more closely, if destination host names are used instead
of IP addresses. This is straightforward for the kind of attacker we have in mind,
i. e. the provider of a HTTP proxy.
Each instance consists of a multiset (xfx11 , x
fx2
2 , . . . , x
fxm
m ) containing all the
hosts xj and their respective access frequencies fxj ∈ N0 for a given user and ses-
sion. From the multisets, we obtain attribute vectors x = f = (fx1 , fx2 , . . . , fxm)
for all visited hosts m that are present in the dataset. Even for rather small
user groups, those vectors become very sparse as the number of distinct websites
increases rapidly.
The re-identification attack consists of two stages. Firstly, the attacker has
to obtain a set of k training instances Itrain = {(x1, c1) , . . . , (xk, cn)} ; ci ∈
C; k ≥ n; n ≤ |C| that he labels with class information.3 Afterwards, he will use
a classifier to predict the class, i. e. the user, of a number of test instances in
order to establish a mapping between the sessions contained in the test instances
and the sessions within the training instances.
3.2 Multinomial Naïve Bayes (MNB)
The Multinomial Naïve Bayes (MNB) classifier is a well known method for text
mining tasks [33]. The choice of the MNB classifier is motivated by the fact
that attributes in natural language models and in our model, which relies on
host access frequencies, both are distributed according to a power-law, i. e. their
frequency distribution is heavy-tailed.
Although Naïve Bayes and related probabilistic classifiers naïvely assume in-
dependence of attributes (which is often not the case for real-world problems),
they have been applied to many privacy-related classification attacks with great
success. Of particular interest for our analysis is the application to traffic analy-
sis problems (cf. [12,38,22,32]) and to website fingerprinting [19,13] in previous
3 The class labels may either be actual real names of the users, in case the attacker
already knows them for the training instances or can deduce them using context
information. Alternatively, the attacker can use arbitrarily chosen user IDs, i. e.
pseudonyms, in case he does not know the real identities of the respective users
during the training stage yet. Later on he can substitute the pseudonyms with real-
world identifiers, once users have revealed (parts of) their identity by their online
activities (which is not within the scope of this paper).
works. We apply the MNB classifier to the host access frequencies within individ-
ual user sessions. Given m unique hosts, the classifier evaluates the probability
that a given instance f belongs to some class ci as:
P (f|ci) ∼
m∏
j=1
P (X = xj |ci)fxj
The resulting probability is proportional to the product of P (X = xj |ci),
which is the probability that a certain host xj is drawn from the aggregated
multiset of all host accesses of the training instances of class ci. The individual
probabilities contribute fxj times to the result, where fxj is the number of ac-
cesses to host xj in the test instance at hand. In other words: the more often the
dominant hosts of the test instance f appear in the training instances of class
ci, the more likely does instance f belong to class ci. The classifier will select
the class ci for with the highest value P (f |ci) is observed. For a more formal
coverage of the MNB classifier refer to a recent text book by Manning et al. [21].
3.3 Vector Transformations
There are several transformations that – if applied to the raw attribute vectors
– have shown to improve the accuracy of classifiers on text mining problems. We
will analyse to what extent web user re-identification attacks benefit from them.
TF Transformation Extremely high frequencies of a small number of
attributes can overshadow the contribution of the remaining features, which
makes it difficult for the classifier to distinguish between instances of different
classes. A frequently mentioned solution is to apply a sublinear transformation
to the raw occurence frequencies: f∗xj = log(1+ fxj ), the so-called term frequency
(TF) transformation (cf. [33] for details).
IDF Transformation Using raw vectors all attributes (host frequencies)
contribute equally to the resulting vector, regardless of their relevance. Popular
hosts that are part of a vast majority of instances do not confer much information
about a class, though. This problem can be alleviated using the inverse docu-
ment frequency (IDF) transformation: given n training instances the occurrence
frequencies fxj are transformed using the document frequency dfx, i. e. the num-
ber of instances that contain term x: f∗xj = fxj · log ndfxj . The application of both
of the aforementioned transformations is referred to as TF-IDF transformation
[33].
Cosine Normalisation (N) Results from empirical research have shown
that the accuracy of many classifiers and information retrieval algorithms can be
greatly improved by normalizing the lengths of all instance vectors [21, p. 128].
This is usually achieved by applying cosine normalisation, i. e. all frequencies are
divided by the Euclidean length of the raw vector: fnormxj =
f∗xj
‖(f∗x1 ,...,f∗xm )‖ . While
it stands to reason that cosine normalization is reasonable for text documents,
its utility for the web user re-identification problem may seem counterintuitive
at first sight: the total number of requests of a session seems to be a promising
feature for differentiation, after all.
Table 1: Properties of our proxy user linkability dataset
Duration in days 57
Number of HTTP requests 2,684,736
Number of unique destination hosts 25,124
Transmitted data volume in GiB 110.74
4 Data Acquisition
In this section we will outline our data acquisition methodology and present the
dataset used for the evaluation of the user re-identification attack. To collect
web surfing data, we recorded the web traffic of 28 web users at the university
of Regensburg (cf. Table 1 for descriptive statistics of the dataset).
Our participants installed a proxy server (a slightly modified version of
Privoxy4), which recorded all of their HTTP traffic, on their local client ma-
chines. We provided a convenient obfuscation and submission tool that enabled
users to anonymize log files on their machines before uploading them to a central
server for later collection. The tool labelled the logs with a static user-specific
pseudonym (e. g. RQFSPJ75 ) and obscured the requested URLs (see below).
To conceal the IP addresses of our participants, we made sure that the log files
themselves did not contain any source IP addresses and encouraged the partic-
ipants to upload their logs using an anonymization service like JonDonym or
Tor.5
The requested URLs were split into multiple components (scheme, host, port,
path) before hostnames and paths were obfuscated using a salted hash-function.
The salt value was hard-wired in the obfuscation tool and ensured that there
would be a consistent mapping between host names and hash values for all users.
The hash function was repeatedly applied to discourage dictionary attacks during
the study. Once the study was completed we deleted all references to the salt in
order to reduce the risk of dictionary attacks in the future. Our participants were
satisfied with the basic level of protection offered by our URL pseudonymization
scheme. Even the technically savvy ones, who were familiar with signature and
fingerprinting attacks on such log files (cf. [7,15]), were willing to accept the
remaining risks.
While our user group is rather small and certainly biased to some degree, our
user profiles also have some advantage in comparison to profiles compiled from
passively collected flow traces of a large network segment like used by Kumpost
[17]: Firstly, the user group is quite homogeneous and shares common interests
(24 out of 28 participants are undergraduate or postgraduate students with high
affinity towards information technology); this may also be the case in reality for
users who share the same proxy server. Secondly, we know as a ground truth
that all HTTP requests submitted by a user (i. e. labelled with his pseudonym)
4 Available for download at http://www.privoxy.org/
5 Available for download at http://www.jondonym.com/ and http://torproject.org/.
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Fig. 2: Overview of dataset used for evaluation
originate from exactly one individual6, while passively collected profiles may be
subject to unobservable influences such as multiple people sharing one IP address
or sudden changes in the IP address assignment of a user. Finally, our user
profiles are mostly comprised of requests issued via the user’s web browser: only
14 % of the participants chose to submit all HTTP requests of their machines.
Fig. 2 shows the participation of users over the course of the study as well as
the amount of HTTP requests contributed by the individual users. The number
of users contributing data on a given day varies between 3 and 22. 15 users or
more contributed on at least 50% of the days, with contributions ranging from
10 to 57 days. The number of HTTP requests submitted by the individual users
varies considerably: the 50% most active users contribute 80% of the requests,
with the most active user contributing 14.6% of the total number of requests.
Note that we will disregard any context information as well as timing information
and activity patterns regarding to specific weekdays in this paper. Instead, we
will only consider the access frequencies of the destination servers to assess the
effectiveness of our web user re-identification attack.
5 Evaluation Methodology and Results
In this section we evaluate the user re-identification attack using our dataset.
The evaluation consists of two parts, which allow us to analyse different aspects.
In the first part, which we call the attacker’s view, we merge all the log files of
our participants (maintaining the exact timing of the requests). This allows us to
evaluate the feasibility of the user re-identification attack if all participants had
used a malicious central proxy server for our study. The second part consists of
simulations which analyse the impact of various parameters on the effectiveness
of the attack using random samples of our dataset.
6 This claim is substantiated by the results of an anonymous questionnaire we re-
quested the participants to fill out.
Table 2: Evaluation of predictions from an attacker’s point of view for
user u (with class cu) with training instances xt· and test instances xt+1· .
TP/FP/TN/FN conditions are shown for clarity; cases are sorted according to
their evaluation: correct (1, 2), wrong-detectable (3, 4) and wrong-undetectable
(5, 6).
(1) TP:1 FP:0
TN:0 FN:0
u contributed on days t and t+ 1; user’s instance xu was
correctly assigned to cu; attacker can track u
(2) TP:0 FP:0
TN:1 FN:0
u contributed on day t only; no instance was incorrectly
assigned to cu
(3) TP:0 FP>1
TN:0 FN:1
u contributed on both days, but xt+1u was not assigned to
cu; multiple instances xv; v 6= u were assigned to cu
(4) TP:1 FP>0
TN:0 FN:0
u contributed on both days; xt+1u was assigned to cu; at
least one instance xv; v 6= u was assigned to cu
(5) TP:0 FP:0
TN:0 FN:1
u contributed on both days; but no instance was assigned
to cu at all; attacker believes there is no xt+1u and loses
track of u; attacker confuses this prediction with (2)
(6) TP:0 FP:1
TN:0 FN:0
u contributed on both days, but xt+1u was not assigned to
cu; one instance xv; v 6= u was assigned to cu; attacker
confuses v with u; attacker confuses this prediction with (1)
5.1 Attacker’s View
We start out with an attacker on a proxy server who exploits characteristic
surfing patterns to re-identify individual users on consecutive days, i. e. we con-
sider sessions with a duration of 24 hours (we study other session times and
non-consecutive sessions in Section 5.2).
Therefore, we assume that on one day t the attacker decides to track a specific
user ut from now on (e. g. due to a intriguing request of that user). The attacker
chooses u from the set of all users U t who are present on day t. For the attack he
sets up a classifier with |U t| classes c (one for each user), and trains the classifier
with the available instances xt· of all users from U t (one instance per user). On
the next day, the attacker tries to find the instance xt+1u , i. e. all the instances
that are predicted to belong to class cu are of interest. Ideally, only the correct
instance xt+1u will be assigned to cu.
Due to the peculiarities of the attacker’s view there are more than the four
canonical evaluation results (true positives, false positives, true negatives and
false negatives) [33]. Table 2 contains an overview of our more differentiated
evaluation scheme. The prediction of the classifier can either be correct (1, 2),
wrong-detectable (3, 4) or wrong-undetectable (5, 6).
Evaluation Results We iterate over all days and users and evaluate the predic-
tion of the MNB classifier for the transformations presented in Section 3.3. Each
Table 3: Classification accuracy for attacker’s view (AV) and simulation (SIM),
i. e. the proportion of user sessions for which the classifier correctly and unam-
biguously predicted the correct class (1) or correctly predicted that the user did
not participate on the second day (2).
none N IDF IDFN TF TFN TFIDF TFIDFN
(AV) 60.5% 62.9% 65.0% 62.8% 56.0% 73.1% 66.1% 72.8%
(SIM) 55.5% 56.2% 65.0% 60.2% 53.3% 77.1% 68.5% 80.1%
prediction is evaluated independently, i. e. the conceived attacker is stateless and
does not change his behaviour based on the predictions on previous days. For
each experiment we report the overall classification accuracy, i. e. the proportion
of correct predictions (1, 2). An overall comparison of the various transforma-
tions is shown in the (AV) row in Table 3. Cosine normalisation (N) increases the
accuracy of the classifier significantly when applied in combination with one of
the other transformations. The TFN transformation leads to the highest number
of correct predictions: 73.1% of all day-to-day links were correctly established,
i. e. user u was either re-identified unambiguously (1) or the classifier correctly
reported that u was not present on day t+1 any more (2). Note that the utility
of the IDF transformation is rather limited in the attacker’s view scenario. This
counterintuitive finding can be explained by the relatively small number of only
765 predictions in the attacker’s view scenario.
While already this basic attack achieves respectable results, there is certainly
room for improvements. We present only one of them here: learning. We have
found that the accuracy of the classifier can be increased considerably, if the
attacker is not stateless, but is allowed to “learn”, i. e. he can add already pre-
dicted instances xt+1u to the set of training instances for user u, if the prediction
appears to be correct (1,6). In the case of the MNB classifier and the TFN trans-
formation, the proportion of correct decisions (accuracy) increased from 73.1%
to 77.6%, the proportion of detectable errors decreased from 14.5% to 12.5%
and the proportion of undetectable errors decreased from 12.4% to 9.8%.
5.2 Simulations
The results obtained from the attacker’s view experiments indicate that a central
proxy can carry out the web user re-identification attack for small user groups
like ours. Due to its dynamic nature, i. e. not all users having participated on all
days (cf. Fig. 2a), the attacker’s view is not very suitable for analysing influence
factors that determine the effectiveness of the attack, though. Thus, we will
resort to simulations, in which we set up well-defined and balanced scenarios, to
gain further insights.
Each simulation experiment works on a random sample of training and test
instances drawn from the whole dataset. For each user 10 pairs of training and
testing sessions are drawn for each experiment (iterations). The properties of the
pairs are controlled by a number of parameters. Only one parameter is varied in
each experiment to analyse its influence. The varied parameters are:
– session duration in minutes (default: 1440, i. e. 1 day),
– number of simultaneous users (default: 28),
– offset between the last training session and the test session
(default: the session duration, i. e. adjacent sessions) and
– number of consecutive training instances (default: 1).
The default setup simulates all 28 users concurrently surfing on 10 days (iter-
ations), i. e. for each iteration there are 28 training sessions (1 for each user),
each one capturing all requests of the user within one day. Training and test
sessions are not drawn independently, though: for each user the random ses-
sion selection process prefers training sessions, which have a (chronologically)
immediately succeeding session for the respective user. The succeeding session
will then be selected as the test session. This ensures that the parameter “offset
between the last training and the test session” equals the session duration for
all users. The classifier will be trained with the training sessions (which may in
fact come from different days in our real-world dataset) and will have to make
a prediction for each of the 28 test sessions. This training and prediction will be
repeated for the 10 randomly drawn session pairs (iterations).
The simulation results are obtained by repeating each experiment 25 times
and taking the average of the obtained accuracy. This approach incorporates a
large proportion of the dataset in each experiment: the classifier makes 25 · 10 ·
28 = 7000 predictions per simulation experiment. The results for the applica-
tion of the various text mining transformations are shown in the (SIM) row of
Table 3. The TFIDFN transformation achieves slightly better results than the
TFN transformation here. The results of all of the following simulations were
obtained using the TFN transformation, though, which has lower computational
costs and still offers comparable accuracy.
Evaluation Results The results of the simulations are summarized in Fig. 3
for various session durations. Fig. 3a shows that the accuracy of the classifier
decreases once session durations become shorter than one day (1440 minutes),
which we found is due to the smaller amount of distinct sites and issued requests
visited within them. Thus, the information amount available to the classifier
decreases. The accuracy increases once again for short sessions below 30 minutes.
This is partly due to users’ activites spanning session boundaries, which increases
the linkability of two adjacent sessions. Furthermore, accuracy increases with
decreasing numbers of concurrent users (Fig. 3b), which explains the higher
accuracy of the classifier for the attacker’s view scenario.
Fig. 3c shows that the quality of the user profiles deteriorates only moderately
over time. The waveform patterns in the plot for session durations of 1 and 3
hours have a periodicity of 24 hours. Thus, it is easier to link two sessions of a
user if they are obtained at the same time of day on different days. Apparently,
our users exhibit different behaviour at different times during the day.
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Fig. 3: Simulation results: influence of various parameters on proportion of cor-
rectly classified sessions (y-axis);
According to Fig. 3d the accuracy will increase if the attacker manages to
obtain not only 1 but multiple consecutive training sessions of a given user or
is able to correctly link multiple consecutive sessions of a user (cf. “learning” in
Section 5.1). While the gain in accuracy caused by an additional training in-
stance diminishes quite fast for immediately adjacent sessions, multiple training
instances can be very useful when it comes to test instances whose offset to the
training instance is larger. This becomes evident in Fig. 3d by comparing the
slopes of the two curves supplied for 1-hour sessions with training/test offsets of
1 hour and 48 hours. For the latter the accuracy increases more rapidly for up
to 5 additional training instances.
5.3 Linkability Metric
We analyzed the dataset for peculiarities that can explain the effectiveness of the
classifier. Therefore, we constructed a numerical host linkability metric L ∈ [0; 1]
that captures the degree of re-identifiability of a user u that is caused by accessing
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Fig. 4: Distinctive hosts and average linkability for various session durations
a specific host h. With this metric we can uncover hosts that almost immediately
identify users once they request a website from them (cf. also [17, p. 62] for a
different approach). Considering the multiset of website requests Ru of user u,
the multiset of website requests Rh involving host h, the set of sessions Su of
user u and the set of sessions Sh involving host h, we obtain the host linkability
as follows:
L(h, u) =
|Ru ∩Rh|
|Rh| ·
|Su ∩ Sh|
|Su|
In words: A host h allows for immediate re-identification of a user u, if h is
only accessed by u and if u visits h in each of his sessions; this is expressed by
a host linkability value of L(h, u) = 1. If an attacker knew the hosts with L = 1
– we call them distinctive hosts – he wouldn’t have to rely on our classification
technique but could directly re-identify the respective users. We found 17 dis-
tinctive hosts in our dataset for nine users with a session time of 1440 minutes
(cf. Fig 4). If a host is distinctive for a user for a session duration da, it will also
be distinctive for this user for all session durations db > da. With decreasing
session duration the linkability values for all hosts are decreasing as well, i. e. it
is less likely to encounter a distinctive host in shorter sessions.
6 Countermeasures
A user can blur his behavioral profile by distributing his web requests over
multiple (non-colluding) proxy servers (similar to the ideas proposed by Olivier
[26]). A single server will then only see a subset of the requests of the user. There
are many conceivable variants of such a distribution scheme: e. g. based on time
(switching the server at regular intervals) or based on destination (all requests for
hosts (h1, h2, h3) are sent to server s1, requests for hosts (h4, h5, h6) are sent to a
different server s2. We leave the design and evaluation of various strategies open
for future work. Instead we only analyse a basic strategy, which may serve as a
baseline for benchmarking: randomly distributing all the requests of a user over
multiple proxies. According to the results for 1, 10, 20 and 50 servers (cf. Fig. 5a),
this strategy is effective, but not very efficient.
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Fig. 5: Effectiveness of countermeasures
Removing requests from log files In principle the web user re-identification
attack is also applicable to log files of proxy servers that are shared or publicly
available. There is a number of obfuscation tools that help to protect the pri-
vacy of the users whose requests are contained in the logs. Some tools (such as
tcpmkpub, tcpdpriv or the Perl module NetAddr::IP::Obfuscate) rely on a con-
sistent hashing or obfuscating scheme of IP addresses, which ensure that a given
input address is always mapped to the same obfuscated output address. Thus,
our web user re-identification attack can be applied to track users with dynamic
IP addresses in such log files without modification. It could also be applied, if
the proxy operator changed the mapping scheme from time to time.
In order to counter the attack a proxy operator may come to the conclusion
to only share requests to the most popular hosts, which are not supposed to
convey any personally identifying information. To evaluate the validity of this
assumption we have repeated the simulation, restricting it to the most popular
1%, 5%, 10%, 20%, 40% and 50% of the hosts according to a descending
ranking of hosts, which is based on the total number of requests they attracted
(see Fig. 5c). The somewhat surprising results indicate that this approach cannot
prevent the user re-identification attack: the classifier can still link more than
65% of the 1-day sessions (cf. Fig. 5b) if instances are only based on the 1% (=
251) most popular hosts. Due to the long-tailed distribution of access frequencies
the log files contain only 60% of the total requests in this case (cf. Fig. 5c). The
utility of this countermeasure degrades fast: if 10% or more of the most popular
hosts are kept in the log file, accuracy values will not be affected significantly any
more. Classification accuracy is also only moderately affected if the most popular
hosts are skipped (cf. Fig. 5d): training the classifier on 1-day sessions after having
removed the 50% most popular hosts (which is equivalent to skipping 99.91%
of all requests!) still results in an accuracy of 22.9%. Whether log files that have
been stripped in such a way are of any practical use any more, certainly depends
on the particular application at hand.
Anonymization services Instead of distributing their requests over multiple
proxy servers, users can also rely on anonymisation services like Tor or Jon-
Donym. These services prohibit eavesdropping by local adversaries and conse-
quently also protect against any re-identification attacks carried out by them.
The use of anonymisation services may also introduce new risks, though: in mix
networks the exit node learns the true destination hosts as requested by its users.
The Tor network uses circuits, which relay a user’s traffic over a single exit router.
After 10 minutes a circuit is abandoned and a new circuit with another exit node
is set up. If a Tor user relayed all web requests over a single exit node (which is
the default as of now), the exit node could apply our methodology to construct
user session and create a MNB classifier to re-identify users. Collaborating exit
nodes could share such profiles to track users across multiple exit nodes, which
would seriously degrade their privacy. The attack could be prevented, if the Tor
client routed web traffic over multiple exit nodes concurrently.
7 Discussion
Due to the limited scope of our study, we cannot precisely assess the real threat
of user re-identification on the web. The small number of users may limit the
generalisability of our results, but not of our methodology. We are already in the
process of applying it to large DNS log files with several thousand users. Even
for this different, more difficult problem our first results are promising: we are
able to re-identify up to 50% of the users about 80% of the time.
For the purpose of evaluation we modelled a user session as a rigid time
span (e. g. 10 minutes or 24 hours). As a matter of fact, our evaluation tools
will erroneously distribute contiguous requests across two sessions, if the true
user session crosses our session boundaries, which decreases the difficulty of the
classification problem – at least for immediately adjacent sessions. This bias
could be cured with a more realistic session splitting method, e. g. by taking into
account the results of [6,30], which empirically derive actual session boundaries.
The presented basic form of the attack can not only be carried out by proxy
servers or DNS servers, but by any eavesdropper in general. We are aware of the
fact that we disregard promising pieces of information, which may be available
to some attackers, such as the whole URL or request timing. Web proxies could
also inspect the contents of the HTTP messages for identifying information,
e. g. usernames and street addresses. While our methodology can be extended
to support such attributes, we believe that in reality the biggest improvements
will stem from the inclusion of context knowledge: a user who just received his
driver’s license might visit many hosts like myfirstcar.com and firstcar.com over
a period of several days. Future work might take this into account by employing
a semantic model to group hosts according to activities or actual interests.
Finally, we want to point out that our scenario in mind, a closed user group
using a single proxy server, allows us to make a closed-world assumption, i. e. each
instance belongs to a user of that group. Consequently, our classifier will output
a prediction for each and every test instance no matter how likely it is. In some
real-world situations, e. g. tracking one user among thousands of unknown users,
this approach will cause a false alarm for the majority of instances. Adapting the
methodology to cope with such scenarios (e. g. by using a probability threshold
or reject class) is certainly an interesting area for future work.
8 Conclusion
Using a privacy-preservingly collected real-world dataset we have demonstrated
that an adversary can re-identify web users based on their past browsing be-
haviour. Thus, malicious providers of (small-scale) web proxies may be able to
track their users. Profile degradation over time is only moderate and it can be
alleviated using multiple training instances. According to our results, counter-
measures such as distributing web requests over multiple proxies can reduce the
accuracy of our attack, but they come at a considerable cost.
Our technique is based on the observed access frequencies of hosts. It does not
depend on any timing information or context knowledge, and it is totally agnostic
of the type of host or the actual contents retrieved. Instead, we exploit the
diversity on the World Wide Web: specific user interests (such as reading news
or social networking) can be satisfied at a large number of different sites, which
is reflected by the long-tailed distribution of access frequencies. Consequently,
web user re-identification may even succeed for users with very similar interests
– as long as they have a distinct preference regarding the websites where they
pursue them.
Acknowledgments
This work has been partially sponsored and supported by the European Union
EFRE project. The authors are grateful to the participants of the study who con-
tributed their web requests. This paper has benefitted from fruitful discussions
with Jacob Appelbaum, Karl-Peter Fuchs, Nico Görnitz, Konrad Rieck, Florian
Scheuer, Rolf Wendolsky, Benedikt Westermann and from helpful comments by
the anonymous reviewers.
References
1. Lada Adamic and Bernardo Huberman. Zipf’s Law and the Internet. Glottometrics,
3(1):143–150, 2002.
2. Ricardo Baeza-Yates and Berthier Ribeiro-Neto. Modern information retrieval.
New York, Addision Wesley, 1999.
3. Michael Barbaro and Tom Zeller. A Face is Exposed for AOL Searcher No. 4417749.
The New York Times, August 9, 2006.
4. Lee Breslau, Pei Cue, Pei Cao, Li Fan, Graham Phillips, and Scott Shenker. Web
Caching and Zipf-like Distributions: Evidence and Implications. In In INFOCOM,
pages 126–134, 1999.
5. Justin Brickell and Vitaly Shmatikov. The cost of privacy: destruction of data-
mining utility in anonymized data publishing. In KDD ’08: Proceeding of the 14th
ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining,
pages 70–78, New York, NY, USA, 2008. ACM.
6. Lara D. Catledge and James Edward Pitkow. Characterizing Browsing Behaviors
on the World-Wide Web. Georgia Institute of Technology, 1995.
7. Scott E. Coull, Michael P. Collins, Charles V. Wright, Fabian Monrose, and
Michael K. Reiter. On Web Browsing Privacy in Anonymized NetFlows. In Pro-
ceedings of the 16th USENIX Security Symposium, Boston, MA, August 2007.
8. Scott E. Coull, Charles V. Wright, Angelos D. Keromytisz, Fabian Monrose, and
Michael K. Reiter. Taming the devil: Techniques for evaluating anonymized net-
work data. In Proceedings of the 15th Network and Distributed Systems Security
Symposium, 2008.
9. Scott E. Coull, Charles V. Wright, Fabian Monrose, Michael P. Collins, and
Michael K. Reiter. Playing devil’s advocate: Inferring sensitive information from
anonymized network traces. In in Proceedings of the Network and Distributed Sys-
tem Security Symposium, pages 35–47, 2007.
10. Mark E. Crovella and Azer Bestavros. Self-similarity in World Wide Web traffic:
evidence and possible causes. IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw., 5(6):835–846, 1997.
11. Peter Eckersley. How Unique Is Your Web Browser? Technical report, Electronig
Frontier Foundation, 2009.
12. Jeffrey Erman, Anirban Mahanti, and Martin Arlitt. Internet Traffic Identifica-
tion using Machine Learning. In Proceedings of IEEE Global Telecommunications
Conference (GLOBECOM), pages 1–6, San Francisco, CA, USA, November 2006.
13. Dominik Herrmann, Rolf Wendolsky, and Hannes Federrath. Website fingerprint-
ing: attacking popular privacy enhancing technologies with the multinomial naïve-
bayes classifier. In CCSW ’09: Proceedings of the 2009 ACM workshop on Cloud
computing security, pages 31–42, New York, NY, USA, 2009. ACM.
14. Melanie Kellar, Carolyn Watters, and Michael Shepherd. A field study character-
izing Web-based information-seeking tasks. Journal of the American Society for
Information Science and Technology, 58(7):999–1018, 2007.
15. Dimitris Koukis, Spyros Antonatos, and Kostas G. Anagnostakis. On the Privacy
Risks of Publishing Anonymized IP Network Traces. In Communications and
Multimedia Security, pages 22–32, 2006.
16. Marek Kumpošt. Data Preparation for User Profiling from Traffic Log. Emerging
Security Information, Systems, and Technologies, The International Conference
on, 0:89–94, 2007.
17. Marek Kumpošt. Context Information and user profiling. PhD thesis, Faculty of
Informatics, Masaryk University, Czeck Republic, 2009.
18. Marek Kumpošt and Vašek Matyáš. User Profiling and Re-identification: Case
of University-Wide Network Analysis. In TrustBus ’09: Proceedings of the 6th
International Conference on Trust, Privacy and Security in Digital Business, pages
1–10, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2009. Springer-Verlag.
19. Marc Liberatore and Brian Neil Levine. Inferring the Source of Encrypted HTTP
Connections. In CCS ’06: Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer
and communications security, pages 255–263, New York, NY, USA, 2006. ACM
Press.
20. Bradley Malin and Edoardo Airoldi. The Effects of Location Access Behavior
on Re-identification Risk in a Distributed Environment. In Privacy Enhancing
Technologies, pages 413–429, 2006.
21. Christopher D. Manning, Prabhakar Raghavan, and Hinrich Schütze. Introduction
to Information Retrieval. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2008.
22. Andrew W. Moore and Denis Zuev. Internet traffic classification using bayesian
analysis techniques. In SIGMETRICS ’05: Proceedings of the 2005 ACM SIG-
METRICS international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer
systems, pages 50–60, New York, NY, USA, 2005. ACM Press.
23. Arvind Narayanan and Vitaly Shmatikov. Robust de-anonymization of large sparse
datasets. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 111–125, 2008.
24. Hartmut Obendorf, Harald Weinreich, Eelco Herder, and Matthias Mayer. Web
Page Revisitation Revisited: Implications of a Long-term Click-stream Study of
Browser Usage. In CHI 2007, pages 597 – 606. ACM, ACM Press, 5 2007.
25. Paul Ohm. Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of
Anonymization. Social Science Research Network Working Paper Series, August
2009.
26. Martin S. Olivier. Distributed Proxies for Browsing Privacy: a Simulation of Flocks.
In SAICSIT ’05: Proceedings of the 2005 annual research conference of the South
African institute of computer scientists and information technologists on IT re-
search in developing countries, pages 104–112, , Republic of South Africa, 2005.
South African Institute for Computer Scientists and Information Technologists.
27. Balaji Padmanabhan and Yinghui Yang. Clickprints on the Web: Are there signa-
tures in Web Browsing Data? Working Paper Series, October 2006.
28. Jeffrey Pang, Ben Greenstein, Ramakrishna Gummadi, Srinivasan Seshan, and
David Wetherall. 802.11 user fingerprinting. In MobiCom ’07: Proceedings of the
13th annual ACM international conference on Mobile computing and networking,
pages 99–110, New York, NY, USA, 2007. ACM.
29. Ruoming Pang, Mark Allman, Vern Paxson, and Jason Lee. The devil and packet
trace anonymization. SIGCOMM Comput. Commun. Rev., 36(1):29–38, 2006.
30. Jaideep Srivastava, Robert Cooley, Mukund Deshpande, and Pang-Ning Tan.
Web usage mining: discovery and applications of usage patterns from Web data.
SIGKDD Explor. Newsl., 1(2):12–23, 2000.
31. Latanya Sweeney. k-anonymity: A model for protecting privacy. International
Journal of Uncertainty Fuzziness and Knowledge Based Systems, 10(5):557–570,
2002.
32. Nigel Williams, Sebastian Zander, and Grenville Armitage. A preliminary perfor-
mance comparison of five machine learning algorithms for practical IP traffic flow
classification. SIGCOMM Comput. Commun. Rev., 36(5):5–16, 2006.
33. Ian H. Witten and Eibe Frank. Data Mining. Practical Machine Learning Tools
and Techniques. Elsevier, San Francisco, 2005.
34. Gilbert Wondracek, Thorsten Holz, Engin Kirda, and Christopher Kruegel. A
Practical Attack to De-Anonymize Social Network Users. iseclab.org.
35. Yinghui Yang. Web user behavioral profiling for user identification. Decision
Support Systems, 49:261–271, 2010.
36. Yinghui (Catherine) Yang and Balaji Padmanabhan. Toward user patterns for
online security: Observation time and online user identification. Decision Support
Systems, 48:548–558, 2008.
37. George Kingsley Zipf. The psycho-biology of language. An introduction to dynamic
philology. M.I.T. Press, Cambridge/Mass., 2nd edition, 1968.
38. Denis Zuev and Andrew W. Moore. Traffic Classification Using a Statistical Ap-
proach. In Passive and Active Network Measurement, pages 321–324, 2005.
